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Abstract—Machine learning models benefit from large and
diverse datasets. Using such datasets, however, often requires
trusting a centralized data aggregator. For sensitive applications
like healthcare and finance this is undesirable as it could compro-
mise patient privacy or divulge trade secrets. Recent advances
in secure and privacy-preserving computation, including trusted
hardware enclaves and differential privacy, offer a way for
mutually distrusting parties to efficiently train a machine learning
model without revealing the training data. In this work, we
introduce Myelin, a deep learning framework which combines
these privacy-preservation primitives, and use it to establish a
baseline level of performance for fully private machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) has enabled a variety of applications
from smart-homes to personal assistants. Such success is largely
due to recent algorithmic breakthroughs, increased availability
of computational resources, and access to vast quantities of
data which enable training complex models. However, such
datasets often contain sensitive information and therefore
raise several privacy concerns. For instance, it has recently
been demonstrated that personally identifying information can
be inferred from even rough estimates of an ad campaign’s
audience size [29].
Additionally, machine learning models can benefit from
multiple providers’ shared data. Examples include clinical
researchers training a model on patient information from several
geographically distributed clinics, and banks pooling data to
train a higher quality fraud detection model. In both cases,
directly sharing data is unacceptable: the clinics must protect
their patients’ privacy and banks desire to protect their trade
secrets. Thus, protecting the confidentiality of the data, the
model, and the computations on them requires a privacy-
preserving machine learning platform.
Although it is currently possible to train fully private
individual ML models, existing systems for privacy-preserving
machine learning are unable to accommodate to the large-scale,
highly flexible deep learning models which power modern ML
services. For instance, federated learning [26], designed to
allow multiple users to jointly train a private model, has been
shown to be vulnerable against certain privacy attacks [17].
Approaches based on direct cryptographic operation over
models and data incur a performance penalty of 3 to 4
orders of magnitude. Moreover, for those which depend on
trusted hardware, supporting deep learning workloads requires
including large libraries which were designed with performance–
not privacy–as a main objective.
In this work, we introduce Myelin, a system designed for
efficient differentially-private and data-oblivious deep learning
in trusted hardware enclaves.
Contributions We demonstrate the base performance of
Myelin through benchmarks on practical ML models. This
paper contributes a system for efficient, fully-private training
of ML models in hardware enclaves. We demonstrate state-
of-the-art single-enclave performance through benchmarks on
practical ML models.
Importantly, Myelin can be deployed on existing commodity
hardware and offers a tool for both production applications as
well as continued exploration of the problem space.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Machine Learning
A common goal of machine learning is to find a model fθ(x)
which minimizes a loss function L by adjusting parameters θ
based on observations x. Models can range in complexity from
simple linear models (e.g., fθ(x) = 〈x, θ〉 ) to deep neural
networks composed of linear models and non-linearities. In
either case, ensuring privacy of data requires protecting both
the data and the parameters [4]. Indeed, for vectors x and θ,
an algorithm could simply set θ = x.
For the model optimization algorithm, we focus on stochastic
gradient descent (SGD), the workhorse of modern, scalable
model training [13]. At its most basic, an SGD update takes
the form
θ(t+1) = θ(t) − η∇θL(fθ(t) , x) (1)
where ∇θ is the gradient of the objective function with respect
to the parameters and η is the step size, or learning rate.
Intuitively, SGD finds the direction which maximally increases
the loss and takes a small step in the opposite direction. SGD
is typically performed in a loop which presents a mini-batch of
m examples to the model and then updates using the average
of their gradients to reduce variance.
B. Trusted Hardware Enclaves
A trusted hardware enclave is a protected environment in
which code can run without external observation and generate
a report verifying its own identity. This is achieved through
memory isolation (e.g., encryption) , a secure random number
generator, and a trusted monitor which manages the enclave’s
interaction with the untrusted world [11]. The threat model is
that of a malicious adversary who can manipulate any aspect
of the system except the contents of the CPU, itself.
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Fig. 1: Overview of Myelin, a system for efficient, distributed, privacy-preserving machine learning. An ML user’s model is
automatically compiled into a high-performance library by TVM (Tensor Virtual Machine) and made private using Myelin. The
model is then privately trained using trusted hardware on privately shared data. The system is described in detail in Section IV.
In addition to having isolated memory, it is necessary than
an enclave be able to attest to its own identity once deployed.
This is generally enabled by a hardware-based root of trust [25]
. Myelin depends on remote attestation to prove its identity
and establish secure communication channels with the data
consumer and each of the data providers.
In this work, we use enclaves provided by Intel Software
Guard eXtensions (SGX) [2]. In SGX, the root of trust is
Intel, their private key, and the keys which they assign to each
processor. Although trusting Intel is a strong assumption, we
note that the techniques introduced to follow generalize to any
enclave implementation (e.g., [11]).
C. Differential Privacy
Applying differential privacy to an algorithm provides a
strong bound on how much information it can leak about any
item of input data. Formally, for all datasets Di, Dj ∈ D
Di, Dj which differ in a single entry, if
Pr[A(Di) ∈ r] ≤ e Pr[A(Dj) ∈ r] + δ ∀r ⊆ R
then A is (, δ)-differentially private [10]. This differs from
the original definition of -DP [9] by the addition of the δ
term which allows -DP to be broken with probability δ 
1/|Di| where |Di| is the size of the dataset. Myelin relies
on differential privacy to allow data consumers to query the
trained model without revealing the training data.
Differential privacy via output perturbation is achieved using
a mechanism M,δ : A×D → A′ which adds noise so that
that A′ is (, δ)-DP. The amount of the noise depends on the
sensitivity of A, which is defined as
SA = max
Di,Dj
|A(Di)−A(Dj)|
|Di −Dj |
Each query to A′ incurs a privacy cost of , so an algorithm
that calls A′ n times is (n, nδ)-DP. This result is known as
strong composition [21].
In the context of machine learning, A is the learning algo-
rithm which trains the model and returns the model parameters.
In Myelin, the learning algorithm is SGD and therefore SA is
the norm of the gradient : maxDi ‖∇θfθ(Di)‖ [27]. Thus,
modifying SGD to produce a differentially private model
requires normalizing the `2 norm of the gradient so that it
does not exceed a bound B and applying M,δ to this clipped
gradient. The noisy gradient is then averaged over the L
examples in each lot of randomly sampled training instances
(a lot can be made of several mini-batches). In this work we
use the Gaussian mechanism and the moments accountant [1]
which, together, offer tight privacy bounds. The Gaussian
mechanism for differentially private SGD is defined as
M,δ(fθ, Di) = clip(∇θf(Di)) +N
(
0,
2B2
2
log
5
4δ
)
(2)
and the differentially private SGD update is
θ(t+1) = θ(t) − η(M,δ(fθ(t) , x)) (3)
The moments accountant tracks the log-moments of the
privacy loss random variable and provides tighter guarantees
than linear strong composition.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION & APPROACH OVERVIEW
We formalize our approach using the following notations.
Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} represent data providers and C be a data
consumer who wishes to train a single machine learning model
on the data of P . The data are sensitive and economically
valuable, so provider pi desires they remain as private as
possible while satisfying the utility requirements of consumer
C. Similarly, C wishes to extract maximal utility from the
data—via the model—given the privacy requirements of all
providers P . Since C has devoted resources to designing the
model and procuring the data, C wants exclusive access to
the trained model and, therefore, that the model parameters
remain private. We consider a scenario in which P and C
agree beforehand on the values of privacy and utility.
A. Threat Model
For the purposes of this work, we assume that each pi
honestly provides data, so data valuation and poisoning attacks
are out of scope. Additionally, we assume that the owner of
the enclave-enabled hardware (e.g., cloud computing service
operator) will not deny service to the system, so we do not
seek to provide liveness guarantees. Otherwise, all parties are
actively malicious and wish to learn the contents of the datasets.
We also assume that the owner of the trusted hardware—
if not the data consumer–would like to obtain the model
parameters and use it to perform inference without having
to agree to the terms set by the data providers . To these ends,
an adversary can observe and modify any runtime aspect of the
untrusted software or physically accessible computing hardware.
This means that an attacker can read the contents of DRAM,
report fake data from syscalls (e.g., time, socket) , observe
interrupts, and arbitrarily schedule program (re-)execution. The
model assumes that CPU internals like registers and caches
are physically inaccessible and safe from outside observation.
Enclave memory is protected either by encryption or physical
inaccessibility. However, enclaves are still vulnerable to side-
and, for some implementations, controlled-channel [30] attacks.
To establish end-to-end privacy, Myelin mitigates these risks
by using data-oblivious [23] algorithms. Additionally, Myelin
is designed so that the privacy-preserving aspects are enabled
by default and transparent to the end user.
B. Overview
Using the notation from Section III, we suppose the following
workflow which is depicted in Figure 1. The process begins
with each data provider pi uploading an encrypted dataset to a
storage service (e.g., AWS, IPFS) and providing an interface
to the decrypted data, Di. For simplicity, one may consider
a Di which yields chunks of data to entities on a whitelist.
Some time later, the data consumer C deploys an enclave E
which proves its identity (or other attributes) to each Di using
remote attestation. The enclave then begins fetching data from
the Dis and training the machine learning model. The trust
of pi in E is based on manual or automatic verification of
the algorithm run by E; this trust is encoded in Di. Once
the algorithm has run to completion, C is allowed to make
unlimited offline queries of the trained model.
Given our threat model, a fully private training algorithm
must be able to run in a hardware enclave and, additionally,
be differentially private and data-oblivious [23].
IV. MYELIN: EFFICIENT FULLY PRIVATE ML
The purpose of Myelin is to facilitate high-performance,
privacy-preserving machine learning training and inference on
multiple distrusting users’ data.
A. Privacy
In its default mode of operation, Myelin runs fully within
an enclave to provide strong privacy guarantees based on data-
oblivious and differentially private algorithms. The enclave,
verified through remote attestation, ensures that the privacy-
preservation mechanisms are faithfully applied.
The fully private training workflow, shown in Figure 2,
begins with the data consumer deploying a Myelin enclave
to an enclave-enabled device. The enclave then uses remote
attestation to establish a secure communication channel with
each of the data provider interfaces. The enclave then randomly
initializes all model parameters (as is standard practice in ML)
and begins the training loop which 1) requests a fixed-sized
chunk of each providers’ data and aggregates them into
a mini-batch, 2) obtains the model’s predictions on the
mini-batch, 3) computes gradients and performs a differentially
private parameter update. During training, all cleartext data
and parameters reside in enclave memory and are therefore
protected from observation. Differential privacy then provides
an upper bound on the amount of information the parameters
leak about any provider’s data—even when the data consumer
is allowed unrestricted offline black-box access to the model.
Although the enclave protects the contents of the CPU and
memory, data may still be exfiltrated through side-channel
attacks. For instance, using maliciously constructed inputs,
timing the max operator can reveal the value of a target input.
A similar attack can expose the value of a floating point number
by measuring the extra cycles taken when the value is sub-
normal (very near zero) [3]. To mitigate the risk of side-channel
attacks, Myelin implements data-oblivious [23] algorithms,
such that disk, memory, and network accesses do not depend
on the data.
Network obliviousness is achieved by requesting fixed-size
chunks of data from all data provider interfaces (Di) at each
training iteration; training does not proceed until all providers
have yielded a chunk of data. For protecting the computation
on received data, we build on the data-oblivious primitives
introduced by Ohrimenko et al. and extend them to provide
protection of model parameters against sub-normal floating-
point timing attacks. Since the dense matrix operations used
in deep learning models are already data-oblivious, it mostly
suffices for Myelin to replace data-dependent operators (e.g.,
max-pooling, one-hot encoding) with oblivious variants as
in [23]. To prevent leaking information about sub-normal values,
the data and parameters are perturbed with a small-but-not-
subnormal random number (e.g. 1−10); this is already done
for the weights by the DP mechanism. Model accuracy is not
degraded by either modification–indeed, it is possible to train
accurate models with even 16-bit fixed-point numbers [15].
Computational overhead is kept to a minimum by custom ML
operators included in Myelin.
B. Efficiency
The efficiency of Myelin is based on the use of modular,
optimized numerical libraries for machine learning compu-
tations. These libraries are automatically generated using
the recently introduced TVM stack [6], which allows fine-
grained definition of both primitive operators (e.g., conv2d)
and whole computation graphs. Thus, instead of bundling a
monolithic library like OpenBLAS or LAPACK, Myelin links
to a minimal TVM-generated library which includes only the
operations needed to train the model. The benefits of doing
so are threefold: the generated operators are made faster and
more memory efficient by fusing consecutive computations, the
resulting Myelin binaries become small enough to fit completely
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Fig. 2: Efficient data-oblivious and differentially private training within a trusted hardware enclave. All layers’ parameters are
updated using a DP mechanism (hence the “noisy” background).
within enclave memory, and the TCB is reduced by several
orders of magnitude and becomes amenable to manual or even
automatic verification. Whereas the naive approach of running
a monolithic numerical library like OpenBLAS in a libOS
would require a TCB of over 100k lines of code, the Myelin
runtime requires only 1.5k lines of enclave-aware Rust code.
a) Operator Scheduling: Myelin takes significant ad-
vantage of the fine-grained scheduling allowed by TVM to
increase both performance and privacy. For performance, the
single largest improvement is obtained by parallelizing the
outer loops of operators like matrix multiplication across
several worker threads1. Since a single Myelin enclave can
fully utilize the CPU of a single machine, the system can
make efficient use of a computing cluster through parallel,
distributed training. Additionally, Myelin introduces additional
fusion rules to hide the latency and allocations introduced by
differential privacy. For instance, computing the sensitivity of
the training algorithm requires computing the gradients for
each example. In common autograd frameworks, calculating
m per-example gradients requires copying each parameter m
times and applying the forward pass of the model to each
example individually (though only requiring a single backward
pass) [14]. Notably, this technique does not work for the
spatial convolution operator found in virtually all modern
computer vision models. In Myelin, through the use of custom
TVM operators and schedules, per-example gradients can be
obtained simply, and in a single forward and backward pass,
by scheduling the sum over the batch dimension as a separate
step following gradient clipping and the addition of noise.
Moreover, fusing the clip, noise, and sum operations can hide
extra latency and allocations required when applying DP.
1In Myelin, the TVM operators request threads from the Myelin trusted
runtime, which in turn requests threads from the Myelin untrusted runtime.
The computation does not proceed until all threads re-enter the enclave and
thread allocation is not data dependent, so safety is never violated.
V. EXPERIMENTS
To ascertain the performance/utility trade-offs of privacy-
preserving machine learning, we benchmark Myelin on the
axes of speed and accuracy.
A. Experiment Setup
The model training benchmarks are performed on the CIFAR-
10 image recognition dataset which contains 50k 32x32 color
images and is challenging enough to require models that
approximate those used on real-world tasks. For baselines,
we report performance for the model used in Gazelle [20] and
the VGG9 used in Chiron [19]. We also provide results for a
very deep-yet-narrow ResNet-32 using the setup described
in [16]. Since deeper variants of ResNet have been used
to achieve state-of-the-art performance on the large-scale
ImageNet classification task, the ability to train shallower ones
paves the way to achieving such results privately.
We also present results for inference-only Myelin using
the MobileNet [18] model trained on ImageNet. Inference in
MobileNet takes a full-color 224x224 image and produces
predictions over 1000 object categories. Although Myelin
does not yet support training the depthwise convolutions used
by MobileNet, fully-private inference allows users to make
predictions on their own private data.
All experiments use an Intel Xeon E5-2690 v4 CPU.
For differential privacy, parameters are set following the
example of [1]: privacy parameter  = 4 , DP failure probability
δ = 10−5, and lot size L = 1024. The noise level is chosen to
distribute the privacy budget evenly across all epochs. Since the
expenditure of  places a premium on the number of epochs, we
compress training of both ResNet-32 and VGG9 to 75 and 40
epochs, respectively. This was found not to harm performance
and, in fact, this modification was motivated by observing that
the model had long plateaus in validation accuracy.
B. Myelin Benchmarks
The fully private benchmarks use Myelin in its default
mode, which is described in Section IV. We report results
for training VGG9 and ResNet-32 using Myelin both with
and without privacy preservation techniques; and inference
in MobileNet. As a baselines for training speed, we use the
recently introduced Chiron framework [19], which is based on
trusted hardware enclaves. For inference speed, we compare
to Gazelle [20], which provides privacy via cryptographic
methods, and Slalom [28], which uses trusted hardware in
tandem with an untrusted GPU. Since none of these systems
include differential privacy, we compare using non-DP Myelin
models.
C. Results
Speed
Test
Acc.Model Framework
Train
(min/epoch)
Test
(img/s)
[22] Gazelle (HE+GC) – 0.08 93.1
Myelin 2.28 1111 93.1
VGG9 Chiron (4 enclaves) 6.74 – 88.1
Myelin (1 enclave) 6.68 521 89.5
ResNet-32 Myelin 11.4 476 92.4
MobileNet Slalom (1 enclave+GPU) – 35.7 71.0
Myelin (1 enclave) – 35.1 71.0
TABLE I: Performance comparison of Myelin with related
works. To fairly compare accuracy, the Myelinated models
are trained without differential privacy. An epoch refers to a
complete pass over the training/test set. The CIFAR-10 training
set of contains 50k images.
Model Training Method Speed(mins/epoch) Test Acc.
VGG9 non-private CPU (baseline) 6.12 89.5
Myelin 6.68 84.4
ResNet-32 non-private CPU (baseline) 12.3 92.4
Myelin 12.9 90.8
TABLE II: Performance comparison of fully private training
for VGG9 and ResNet-32 models on the CIFAR-10 image
recognition benchmark. An epoch means one complete pass
over the dataset.
1) Fully Private Myelin: The results of non-private CPU
and fully private in-enclave training are shown in Table II.
Relative to the non-private CPU scenario, we find that the
use of differential privacy and data-oblivious algorithms do
not significantly reduce training speed. This is to be expected
as the majority of computation involves tight, cache-friendly
loops, which avoids the main overheads of context switches
and memory encryption. Additionally, the accuracy of the DP
models is also comparable to that of the non-private models;
this is largely a consequence of the tight privacy loss bounds
provided by the Moments Accountant.
Table I shows the comparison to related work. We observe
that hardware enclaves offer significantly greater efficiency than
cryptographic methods. Furthermore, given the use of enclaves,
we observe that a single Myelin enclave offers better speed and
accuracy than four Chiron enclaves running asynchronously in
parallel. The slight reduction in accuracy for Chiron is actually
due to the asynchrony: its enclaves occasionally produce
gradients using stale copies of the model. Indeed, if four Myelin
enclaves were deployed on four machines, one would expect
a similar reduction in accuracy but with nearly a four-fold
reduction in training time. Perhaps more surprising is that for
trusted inference, Myelin performs as well as Slalom, which
leverages the GPU: Myelin’s multi-threaded enclaves avoid the
overhead of CPU-GPU memory transfer.
Overall, these results show that privacy-preserving training
in hardware enclaves is on par with non-private CPU-based
training. Although a single CPU is not as efficient as a GPU,
the mass availability of CPUs permits highly parallel distributed
training workflows which are heavily used in practice [8].
VI. RELATED WORK
Related work in privacy-preserving machine learning gener-
ally falls into two categories based on the mechanism by which
privacy is provided: namely, trusted hardware enclaves and
direct cryptographic methods like homomorphic encryption
and multi-party computation.
a) Trusted Hardware Enclaves: Despite the demonstrated
utility of enclaves for data analysis [5], directly using them
for machine learning workloads is not wholly straightforward.
Primary challenges are 1) enabling training of efficient, flexible
models within the enclave, 2) protecting against side- and
controlled-channel attacks, and 3) managing data size. An
approach to these challenges depends significantly on the
intended application.
The work of Ohrimenko et al. [23] is based on a setup
similar to ours in that several data providers train a shared
ML model. Their focus, however, is on hiding memory access
patterns for SGX-only training and does not consider DP.
Since their focus is on mitigating side-channel attacks, they
do not directly address the issues of model performance or
data size. Myelin builds on this work by providing optimized
libraries for training data-oblivious deep learning models on
incrementally fetched data.
Concurrent work of Hunt et al. [19] introduces Chiron,
a system for privacy-preserving ML as a service (MLaaS).
MLaaS assumes a single data provider/consumer who trains a
model using the algorithms and trusted hardware of an untrusted
entity. While Chiron does not support GPU accelerated training
and is single threaded within the enclave, it increases throughput
by distributing training across several enclaves (though with a
slight drop in model accuracy). Additionally, Chiron enclaves
must include a model compiler and interpreter, which increases
the TCB and adds runtime overhead. Practically, this means
that they cannot run on existing commodity hardware. Though
the data and model are kept private within the enclave, the
outputs are not differentially private and the computation is
not oblivious, as in Myelin. Of course, Myelin must take
extra precaution to ensure that the multiple data providers
cannot learn each others’ data during training or inference.
Efficiency, in our case, is derived from multi-threaded enclaves
and privacy-preserving training on accelerated hardware. The
modular nature of Myelin enclaves makes distributed training
(potentially as part of a larger model) relatively straightforward,
though we do not benchmark this feature in this work.
Concurrent work of Tramer and Boneh [28] introduces
Slalom, which provides efficient privacy-preserving neural
network inference using trusted hardware which delegates
matrix multiplication to an untrusted GPU. Although their
technique offers greater performance than a single-threaded
enclave, the speedup is limited by the requirement that non-
linear activation functions be computed within the enclave.
While, the cryptographic blinding method used by Slalom does
not immediately lend itself to model training, we hypothe-
size that their inference performance could be improved by
incorporating techniques used in Myelin.
b) Cryptographic Methods: In the absence of trusted
hardware enclaves, primary approaches to privacy-preserving
computation include secure multi-party computation (MPC) like
Garbled Circuits [31] and homomorphic encryption (HE) [24].
The goal of homomorphic encryption is to compute a function
directly on encrypted data. The two-party case of MPC,
which finds use in machine learning, constructs a randomized
(garbled), encrypted Boolean circuit which allows both parties
to compute the function encoded in the circuit without revealing
their private inputs. Each has its respective benefits and, indeed,
can be used in tandem to achieve substantial performance
improvements [20]. The benefits of such cryptographic methods
are that the root of trust is in the algorithms, themselves, and
that they may be used directly with hardware accelerators [12,
7]. Notwithstanding, both HE and MPC come at the cost
of three orders of magnitude greater runtime overhead as
compared to enclaves.
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this work we evaluated, though Myelin, the performance
implications of fully private machine learning on multi-source
private data using trusted hardware. In general, we observe that
private training is on par with CPU-based training. Additionally,
we explored the use of plausible deniability as a method for
training a deep learning model on an untrusted GPU. For CPU-
GPU training, we find that a large speedup is possible but comes
at the price of model accuracy. In either case, by allowing
collaboration between mutually distrusting data providers and
machine learners, we hope to democratize the development and
use of ML-enabled services. To this end, future work includes
integrating Myelin into a distributed data and computation
marketplace so to enable uncoordinated, autonomous execution
of ML models on economically valuable, private data.
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